The African Union (AU) and regional blocs such as the Economic Community of West African States consistently wax indignant each time men in fatigues shoot their way to power, threatening all manner of repercussions. But as I have often written in this column, the coup-makers most likely just chuckle to themselves, well aware that the bark of these multilateral bodies rarely comes with anything resembling a bite.

It is little wonder, then, that military takeovers of power are still very much an African reality, even as we mark the one-quarter milestone of the twenty-first century. Eight have occurred since 2020: two in Mali within nine months, in August 2020 and May 2021; one each in Guinea and Sudan, in September and October 2021 respectively; two in Burkina Faso within eight months, in January and September 2022; one in Niger in July 2023; and one in Gabon a month later. Had seven other attempts not been foiled, the tally would be 15.

That military takeovers in Africa are making a comeback is a pity, given that the continent once established an anti-coup norm through the Lomé Declaration of 2000, which mandated immediate suspension from the Organisation of African Unity – the AU’s antecedent organisation – for illegal power seizures. While the continent averaged about four coup attempts, both successful and otherwise, every year from 1960 to 2000, that number declined by more than half from 2000 to 2017.

The coup comeback over the past eight years can be attributed to the continent’s inexplicable weakened resistance to them, a shift that has rendered the Lomé Declaration increasingly toothless as a deterrent. How else can one explain the continent’s acceptance of Zimbabwean army commanders’ “military-assisted transition” that toppled the late Robert Mugabe and installed Emmerson Mnangagwa in his place?

To its credit, the AU moved swiftly to suspend Gabon’s membership in August 2023, when soldiers seized power following disputed elections that handed Ali Bongo another term at the helm, extending his family’s nearly six-decade hold on power. He took over from his father Omar Bongo, who governed the Central African country from 1967 until his death in 2009.

But where do things stand now? Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema, the coup leader, who has been holding the fort over the past 19 months, secured a landslide victory in elections last month, capturing 90.35% of the votes cast. He is now set to rule as a civilian President for the next seven years and, who knows, for another term thereafter.

Observers declared the elections free and fair, a pronouncement that no doubt paves the way for the suits at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, along with heads of State and other dignitaries from across the continent, to attend his inauguration as Gabon’s fourth elected post-independence President. The noise that accompanied the country’s suspension in August 2023 has long since faded.

What message does this send to soldiers harbouring secret ambitions for political power? Isn’t it that grabbing power is acceptable, as long as you can offer a seemingly credible excuse? Be it the Bongos’ corruption and their by-hook-or-crook grip on power, or Mugabe’s suspected plan to hand over the reins to politicians linked to his wife, justification is never in short supply. The developments in Gabon also send the signal to future coupists that while the AU and others may hop mad in the immediate aftermath of a coup, time will soften their outage.

It’s against this backdrop that I’ve lost all hope that Africa will be immune to coups any time soon.

For those who may be unaware, Africa accounts for 44% of the 491 coups successfully staged between 1950 and August 2023, while Latin America, at 29%, has been the second most affected continent. Additionally, attempts over the past decade, mainly in the Sahel region, have had a much higher success rate than before.

The thing about coups is that, while their architects cite credible reasons for seizing power – security concerns, economic collapse or a narrowing democratic space – meaningful improvement rarely follows. As the Mo Ibrahim Foundation observes, living conditions have generally deteriorated in most instances, with the democratic space remaining restricted, while in places such as Burkina Faso and Mali the security situation has even worsened.

The message that leaps out from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s observation is that nothing can justify the overthrow of a democratically elected government.