It was a hot day in Dubai at COP28 last year. I was invited for coffee by a former German colleague from a past life. Somehow, we veered off track and into a discussion about Ukraine and Africa’s stance, particularly that of South Africa.

My former colleague asked why South Africa and other African countries didn’t back Europe on Ukraine as she murmured impetuously: “Given what Europe has done for Africa.”

Was the suggestion that we were ungrateful, and Europeans are doing us a big favour?

Even though Europe is only about 13 km from the tip of Africa, our distance grows even further. The separation is both cognitive and material, given the perpetuation of the asymmetry in trade, investment and access to markets.

The European request for Africa to show solidarity with their cause against Russia was met with responses ranging from strongly reluctant to lukewarm. There are many reasons for that. In his recent book, titled The Self-Deception Trap: Exploring the Economic Dependency within Africa-Europe Relations, Professor Carlos Lopes seeks to unmask the lurking hypocrisy on both sides. He notes: “At its core, self-deception in politics and diplomacy entails the subtle art of bending reality to align with one’s aspirations, beliefs and self-perception.”

Lopes begins with a famous remark by Joseph Borrell, the former High Representative for Foreign Relations and Vice President of the European Commission, who described Europe as the garden of Eden and Africa as the jungle (sic!).

Not even his left credentials, given he is from the Spanish Socialist Party, restrained the man’s banal prejudices. He was not a lone wolf but a figure pointing us to a home-brewed tendency in Europe these days. There is a convergence of fears and policy positions between most left, centre and right parties on immigration and other issues. A sort of Descartian mind/body split contaminates the spirit of Africa-Europe relations.

Immigrants of a certain race and background are bad for Europe, hence the preoccupation with the topic in European politics and the self-deception rituals of Africa-Europe summits. The model of engagement and legacy persists, as Lopes notes: “The legacy of colonial history influenced the perception of Africa as a recipient in need of assistance rather than as an active participant in its own development.” And further: “The prevailing narrative reinforced a stigmatised image of perpetual misery, portraying Africa as incapable of independently addressing its challenges.”

Lopes’s book covers four main issues. Firstly, he notes that the colonial legacy and mindset have not ended, and the approach towards Africa continues to stifle the hope of going beyond resource extraction. Europe is in strategic competition with China and the US, leading to a sort of panic on the European side to secure new supplies of gas and critical minerals from Africa, but seemingly with little developmental reciprocity. Europeans have no desire to engage Africa on industrialisation or, at least, are not willing to commit to the idea beyond a few countries on the continent.

Secondly, EU diplomacy is based on negotiating in a manner that seeks to conquer through divide and rule. Cases in point are the approach being taken with the Cotonou Agreement and the lack of a sincere desire to work with Africa as a unified entity, using the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement as the key instrument. “The EU’s deliberate engagement with the six ACP regions instead of a unified bloc strategically reflects a ‘divide-and-rule’ approach,” Lopes suggests.

Thirdly, it’s time to recognise that overseas development assistance is not working, and the idea of development assistance in its current form has to be abandoned. Indeed, there is a claim that climate finance is substituting or competing with development assistance, but this is more a question of how one treats climate and development issues; they ought not be opposing sources of finance.

Fourthly, Europe’s demographic profile is changing, while Africa’s is moving into a more dynamic phase of youthfulness. By 2100, and possibly earlier, Africa’s population will constitute a quarter of the world’s population. Europe has no clear strategy for integrating Africa’s surplus youthful labour into initiatives that entrench joint prosperity, given Europe’s aging population.

Lopes critiques the tendency by both Africans and Europeans to overstate the grandiosity of their relations when what is needed is a more prudent and realistic set of goals and concrete ways to work towards them.

In the concluding chapter, Lopes notes that geopolitical shifts are favouring Africa. Europe is no longer the natural partner for Africa but more of a legacy partner. Africa has a diversity of partners to choose from and has received a significant boost by being included in the G20. Moreover, Africa is positively repositioning itself, while Europe is lumbering along, uncertain and preoccupied with its own internal fractures and how to deal with a rampaging Donald Trump.

In the backdrop of Africa sits the European ‘Garden of Eden’, restless under the weight of its own uncertainties.

From an African viewpoint, Europe has no moral high ground. It has already begun the illiberal journey – just look at the European stance on the Middle East. The second factor is the resurgence of traditionalism, which is a force raging through the world, pulling the screws off the democratic edifice, with liberal illiberalism also to blame.

European stability, and the idea of it as a bloc, is being tested.

In the self-deceptive mode of mutual co-existence, there is an understanding that Africa-Europe relations will continue, but they will be dictated by a transactional logic, trapped in a soulless self-negation period of limbo as both sides fail to find their mutual chemistry.

The European model is no longer a bright light and halo, but a dim flicker.