In late January, in fighting in the city of Goma and surrounding districts, in North Kivu province, in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 14 South African soldiers were killed. The foe was the M23 rebel group (allegedly with Rwandan support) which succeeded in overrunning the city.

South Africa is believed to have some 3 000 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) personnel deployed in the DRC, split between the UN’s MONUSCO peacekeeping force, and the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC). The fighting largely involved the SAMIDRC contingent. At deadline, the SANDF and other SAMIDRC troops were still in Goma, with a ceasefire in place, but confined to their bases, with their movements and supplies controlled by M23.

South Africa finds itself with very few, if any practicable, military options to relieve or rescue its encircled troops. This crisis has raised the question: should South Africa have a new Defence Review?

To date, democratic South Africa has had two defence reviews. The first was conducted in 1997/98, and the second over the period 2011 to 2013 (although it was only approved in 2015). The 1997/98 Defence Review proposed an SANDF that would not undertake any operations outside the country’s borders, except for a single army battalion for peacekeeping operations in a benign environment and for a period of only one year. South Africa, however, did not apply such a limited policy, resulting in the 2011–2013 Defence Review. This based itself on what the country had actually been doing and foresaw the simultaneous deployment of three battalion (or stronger) contingents in more hostile environments across Africa. Neither of these Defence Reviews was ever implemented.

New Review?

“South Africa absolutely needs a new defence review,” affirms defenceWeb editor Guy Martin. The previous Defence Review was over a decade old, and South Africa and the world had changed considerably over that period. There had been the Covid-19 pandemic, terrorism in West and Central Africa and in neighbouring Mozambique, and instability and war in the DRC. Further, conflicts elsewhere in the world had seen the nature of warfare change, with uncrewed air, surface and ground vehicles (drones) having a revolutionary impact. Yet, at home, the SANDF had been allowed to deteriorate. “At present, the SANDF is completely overstretched and battling to meet its mandate, as can be seen by the capture of Goma by M23 rebels in January. It is also struggling to keep its aircraft flying, its ships at sea, and its equipment serviceable.”

“There is no question in my mind that South Africa needs a new defence review, and fast,” asserts African Defence Review director Darren Olivier. “If there was ever an indication that the current approach has failed, this past few weeks’ events in North Kivu have without a doubt shown it. South Africa is no longer able to project power the way it used to be able to, and it either has to reconfigure its forces in a way that accepts that reality for the foreseeable future or rebuilds them until it can match its ambitions.”

“The gap between government ambition and actual capabilities has widened quite dramatically since the 1997/98 Defence Review,” highlights Helmoed Heitman, the doyen of South African defence analysts. “In the meantime, the strategic situation has worsened – Mozambique and the DRC come to mind – and other risks remain. There is, therefore, a clear need to revisit what role South Africa must/should/wants to play in the subregion, the region or sub-Saharan Africa and then develop the military capability to make that possible. At the same time, there have been major developments in applied defence technologies and evolving and emerging technologies that will impact force design, doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures – for example, irregular forces using guided mortar bombs, uncrewed aerial vehicles, communications intelligence, and so on. So, we cannot simply go back to the 2015 Defence Review. It is still a sound basis if funded, but needs to be adapted.”

What Is to Be Done?

Heitman argues that a new Defence Review should focus on the country’s vital national interests, the risks to these interests, and how they could be protected. For examples, he cites South Africa’s borders, airspace, and maritime zones; key infrastructure in neighbouring states, such as, in Mozambique, the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric plant, gas-fields (current and future) and the port of Maputo, as well as, in Lesotho, the Highlands Water Scheme. Then the review should look at wider national interests and risks, as well as the measures to address these; examples were fragile neighbours, seaborne trade, and overland trade routes to other African countries. Next, the review would have to take into account how government defined the country’s role in the subregion, region and continent. Only after all this had been done would the SANDF be able to advise government on a suitable defence policy and defence strategy.

Martin affirms that a new Defence Review would have to examine the decline of the SANDF over the past ten years, and how to rebuild as much of it as possible. The operational level required of the SANDF, to fulfil its mandate, would have to be determined, and the funding provided to achieve this. The review would also have to analyse current and future threats facing the country and the continent, and develop the necessary counters to these, which would include developing a new force design and funding model. Funding is critical. The 2015 Defence Review “was a great document” but was totally hamstrung by a lack of funding.

For Olivier, a new Defence Review would have to focus on (in order of priority) the country’s strategic ambitions (and ascertain what they are); the missions and capabilities needed to achieve those ambitions; personnel and human resources profile and strategy (to ensure that the SANDF has the necessary skilled and experienced people); an SANDF digitalisation and network strategy and plan, including cyber and electronic security and redundancy; a ten- to 15-year plan to completely revamp, from top to bottom, the organisation and training of the SANDF, how it promotes people, and how it maintains discipline (its current mindset is too peacetime and peacekeeping, with little focus on real warfighting); a rethinking of the defence procurement, and stores and spares management, systems; and a guaranteed long-term funding plan, to make everything possible.

Plan B

All these proposals require a significant increase in South Africa’s defence budget. Currently, this is about 0.73% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Olivier argues that properly funding the current SANDF requires this to rise to between 1.5% and 2%. Martin points out that the international “norm” is 2%. Heitman notes that the World Bank has found that defence spending of up to 4% of GDP has no adverse impact on economic growth, and could even have some positive effects (especially if a country produced its own defence equipment).

But what if such a budget increase proves politically impossible? What kind of efficient and sustainable SANDF could be maintained with the current budgetary levels?

“The only thing that the SANDF could do to full effect on the present budget is border patrol, airspace surveillance and some maritime surveillance and very limited patrol,” affirms Heitman. “So, staying at the present funding level would mean essentially reconfiguring the SANDF to a border guard and hoping someone else will deal with risks and threats that might arise. And getting to even this state will take a decade and require some initial increase to cover acquisitions.”

“South Africa needs to decide to either fund the SANDF so that it can meet its mandate, or cut back its mandate to meet its limited funding,” opines Martin. “Either the SANDF needs to be adequately resourced or its taskings need to be cut back in line with the limited budget, and expensive international deployments halted, for example.”

“It’s a valid choice for South Africa to decide it wishes to back off from a continental role, and limit its peace mission activity to either low-risk peacekeeping or at least only being a minor partner in any peace enforcement operations,” argues Olivier. “In that case, yes, it’s possible to shrink the force to one with a defensive posture only and small enough to fit within the current and projected spending levels. That will be difficult and it will leave serious gaps in South Africa’s potential future conventional defence of its territory, and those choices should be made transparently and clearly so the public understands the costs.”

Defence Industry

Of what relevance is this to the South African defence industry (SADI)?

Heitman argues that, had the 2015 Defence Review and the consequent defence industrial strategy been implemented, the industry could have expanded again, to some 100 000 employees, earning considerably greater export revenues than previously. “That because the expansion and re-equipment of the SANDF would have given it a solid flow of orders and R&D funding on the back of which it would have been able to market aggressively (assuming competent management and government export support).” However, if the current level of defence spending is maintained, that “would mean the end of the SADI – in the long run countries do not buy equipment from a country that does not itself take defence seriously”.

“A new defence review would most likely be highly beneficial to the [SADI],” affirms Martin. “Although the industry has had to resort largely to export orders to survive, it could very easily support the SANDF with new equipment and services, including training and maintenance. The industry has been shrinking over the last decade, and only seeing a reversal in fortune since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a global rise in military spending. While the industry is doing better than it was, a new defence review would be a major boost and would help create thousands of new jobs.”

Olivier points out that the SADI is currently, in the main, “detached” from the SANDF. But that the industry has generally also suffered from a lack of investment, and has largely had to focus on refining its existing product lines, rather than developing new ones. Likewise, there has been little investment by defence acquisitions and R&D agency Armscor and by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research into the development of new technologies. (The exceptions have been niche areas like electronic warfare (EW) and radar.)

He believes that a new Defence Review that opts to rebuild and reinforce the SANDF could transform the SADI. Such a policy, if implemented, would provide the local industry with the guaranteed order pipeline and necessary funding to permit investment in the products and capabilities that would best be produced locally, or in those areas in which the maintenance of sovereign capabilities was of key importance. Such critical sovereign capabilities included EW systems, “threat libraries” (secure data on the electronic sensors and warfare systems of other countries), missiles and their seekers, and precision guided munitions, and so on. Fully-funded upgrades and refits of SANDF aircraft, ships and vehicles would also stimulate local industry and create jobs.

“South Africa’s defence policy and vision of the late 1990s/early 2000s, that saw a symbiotic role between a capable local industry for certain key capabilities and the modification of foreign ones, and access to a broad market of foreign systems and platforms that it made no sense to build locally was a good one,” he highlights. “It’s a model that has been used with success by many other countries. But it requires a steady stream of ongoing acquisitions and orders, both for new systems and for upgrades to existing ones, to be viable.”