On July 11, 2016, then Conservative Party leader and future UK Prime Minister Theresa May said in one of her speeches: “Brexit means Brexit, and we’re going to make a success of it.”

Brexit is a portmanteau of ‘British’ and ‘exit’ and refers to the UK’s referendum decision to leave the European Union (EU). Brexit happened at 23:00 GMT on December 31, 2020.

So, did the UK leave the EU? Well, superficially, it did. Its flag might no longer be flying outside or adorning the European Commission’s offices in Brussels, but, as with any divorce, there still is a relationship. For now, it is civil. But, in order to move on, the relationship requires structural change. It might be early days, but to be fair, the relationship was over on June 23, 2016. It took the UK 1 652 days to actually leave the EU. Evidently, the UK had the luxury of time, or so it might seem.

Evidently, Brexit merely brought about a change in the relationship between the UK and the EU, which is evidenced by increased paperwork and customs formalities, but this is not a structural change by any stretch of the imagination.

As for relationships, the UK set about ‘rolling over’ the EU’s trade and cooperation agreements with countries of which it was a contracting party. While countries decided to stand up to the UK and to renegotiate their agreements, South Africa decided to sign without negotiation, and to do so at speed. I wrote about this in the column of October 4, 2019, ‘SA’s Brexit approach: Roll over and play dead’.

Although the UK has ‘rolled over’, and continues to ‘roll over’, its trade relationships, it has not effected any structural changes to its supply chain. In commerce, a supply chain is defined as a system of organisations, people, activities, information and resources involved in supplying a product or service to a consumer.

The challenge facing the UK is that its supply chain is integrated within the EU. Some commentators might want to make you believe the UK’s supply chain disentanglement can be equated to unscrambling an egg. Well, if you want to be dramatic.

For too long, the UK has ‘delegated’ trade functionalities to the European Commission and, by extension, to EU member States. Consequently, several EU member States have positioned themselves as central points of contact.

Consider the Port of Rotterdam, which, under ‘Brexit-relevant facts and figures about the Port of Rotterdam’, states: “Regarding volume, after Russia, the UK is the second country of origin for freight transported via sea to and from Rotterdam. After Germany, Belgium and Russia, the UK is the fourth country regarding total throughput, at some 40-million tonnes (8.5% of the Rotterdam total).”

This begs the question: As an island, why would the UK ship goods through the Port of Rotterdam, particularly third-country or non-EU member States’ goods? Take the instance where fruit, vegetables and agricultural goods are coming from the South (South America or Southern Africa); why are the goods shipped past the UK to the Port of Rotterdam, where they are inspected, unloaded and then reloaded and transported to the UK?

You might be asking yourself what the relevance of this article is from a South African perspective? Well, are agricultural goods exclusively destined for the UK market not shipped straight to the UK? In such instances, should the South African government not negotiate less restrictive goods specifications and inspections? Take the Citrus Black Spot (CBS) in oranges, which is not an issue for the UK, as it does not produce oranges. Surely, there is no longer a need for the EU’s CBS specifications in the UK. There must be many similar examples.

It is time for the South African government to initiate the discussion.