I wrote in October last year that the generals who are running the show in Sudan must have chuckled when the African Union (AU) announced it was suspending the country following the overthrow of a civilian-led transitional government.

The transitional government had been in place since the ouster of former dictator Hassan al-Bashir in a popular revolt in April 2019.

My scepticism was attributable to the record of the continental body and its regional appendages – such as the Southern African Development Community in this part of the continent – as paper tigers that are too powerless to call out those who shoot their way to power. The less charitable would put these bodies’ inability to act down to their having morphed into trade unions for the bad guys who govern our countries.

In what, in my view, was a feeble attempt to be seen to be doing the right thing, the AU Peace and Security Council reiterated last month that it had suspended Sudan from all its activities until an effective civilian-led transitional authority had been re-established. It also threatened to impose punitive measures on individual members of the transitional military council or any entities that are obstructing a return to full civilian rule.

But will the AU ‘action’ its threats? I’m not convinced.

Wasn’t it only slightly over a year ago – in June 2021 – following a second military coup in nine months in Mali that the country was suspended “from participation in all activities of the AU, its organs and institutions until the normal constitutional order has been restored in the country”? An additional condition for readmission was that the generals “urgently and unconditionally return to the barracks and refrain from further interference in the political processes in Mali”. The regional bloc, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), went on to impose economic, financial and other sanctions on the country in January this year.

Now Ecowas is singing a different tune, announcing earlier this month that, because the Malian military junta had drawn up a 24-month timetable for the restoration of civilian rule, many of the sanctions would be lifted. What happened to the threat for individual penalties if the coup-ists failed to “urgently and unconditionally return to the barracks”?

With the financial and economic sanctions now lifted and with land and air borders between Mali and its neighbours now open, I don’t see much incentive for the soldiers to relinquish State power.

The same Ecowas summit that decided to take the Mali generals at their word and lessen the punitive measures imposed on the country about six months ago also deliberated on the situation in Guinea and Burkina Faso, where civilian governments were deposed in September last year and January this year respectively.

The Guinea coup leaders tabled a proposal to return the country to civilian rule in three years. This, however, was rejected, with Ecowas demanding that a new timeline be submitted this month, upon pain of economic sanctions. The Burkinabes also proposed a 36-month timeline, but a much shorter transitional period of 24 months was agreed on after some haggling.

I don’t understand the rationale behind negotiating with State power usurpers for them to leave office. They mustn’t be tolerated at all.

Should the fellows in Mali keep their word and allow elections to take place 24 months from now, they would have controlled the levers of power for about three years. Chances are that they will reinvent themselves as civilian politicians during this period and be contestants in the election.

Given the advantage of incumbency, they will probably win. And we wonder why African coups are here to stay!