October has been an event-packed month. We’ve witnessed the passing of Raila Odinga – the President Kenya never had – the electoral defeat of yet another incumbent head of State, Seychelles’ Wavel Ramkalawan, and Gen Z protests in Morocco and Madagascar, with the latter toppling President Andry Rajoelina, now a fugitive in France.

As is its norm, the African Union (AU) moved swiftly to suspend Madagascar’s membership and condemn elements in the military that sided with the protesters and ultimately seized power. But does the continental body genuinely believe the colonel who is now in charge of the country will lose any sleep over this, given its consistent impotence in the face of coups?

Military takeovers of power have been one of post-colonial Africa’s biggest blights, with more than 100 successful ones occurring since the very first one in Egypt in 1952. Only 20 of the AU’s 55 members have remained unscathed.

While the incidence declined from 2000 to 2019, there has been an upsurge in recent years, prompting journalists and scholars to use medical metaphors such as “contagion” and “epidemic” to describe the backsliding. To illustrate this, ten such seizures were staged between April 2019 and August 2023, with the 2021 total of five just one less than the 1966 tally, the highest ever recorded.

It’s difficult not to lay blame for the deterioration at the AU’s doorstep – at least partially. In an apparent move to goad regimes that shoot their way to power towards democracy, the continental body’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, decided in 2000 to impose six months as the maximum period to revert to civilian rule. This is codified in the Lomé Declaration.

But what have we seen happen? Between July 2000 and December 2018, the 12 regimes that seized power lasted a total of 114 months, an average of nine-and-a-half months per regime. Transitions are now taking much longer, even where formal commitments to complete these processes within specified timeframes are made. In Chad and Gabon – two countries where coups were staged after 2020 but now have civilian governments – the transitions took three and two years respectively.

These protracted transitions are compounded by another challenge – relating to an AU rule banning authors of coups and other unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) from participating in elections to restore democracy. Enshrined in the AU’s African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), adopted in 2007 and effective since 2012, the rule is designed to make coups pointless for perpetrators and to level the electoral playing field, as none of the contestants would be able to leverage State resources to tilt the scale in their favour.

This rule was not complied with in both Chad and Gabon, where the heads of the transitional regimes went on to win elections to restore the constitutional order. Surprisingly, the head of the AU Peace and Security Council lauded Chad for having “successfully organised elections during the first half of 2024” while, at a meeting in April this year, following elections in Gabon, the council announced that it had “decided to lift the suspension of the participation of Gabon in AU activities . . . and invited [the country] to immediately resume its participation”.

What’s to stop would-be coup leaders from toppling elected governments when they know that the AU’s forgiveness policy seems to boil down to: stage a coup, hold elections and, thanks to the incumbency advantage that usually ensures victory, waltz back into the fold?

I also take issue with the AU’s characteristic haste in condemning coups while turning a blind eye to conditions in member countries that often serve as the very triggers for those coups. It’s not that it lacks legal provisions to act, even symbolically. The ACDEG is unequivocal: it broadens the definition of a UCG to include “any amendment or revision of the Constitution or legal instrument which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government”. Reinforcing this no-nonsense stance is the yet-to-take-effect Malabo Protocol, which classifies all UCGs as crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

I came across a sobering statistic recently: since 2002, a total of 25 African countries have attempted to unconstitutionally abolish Presidential terms – apparently a crime under the Malabo Protocol – with all but five succeeding.

We would see fewer coups if the AU were tougher with those who hold on to power through illegal means – both military and non-military.