An offhand remark caught my attention in the last stages of the Brazilian presidency of COP30. Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, the lead negotiator, acknowledged that Brazil could achieve only so much. Yet he emphasised that the measure of success should not be limited to what is agreed in the final Conference of the Parties (COP) declarations, but rather in actions taken outside the formal negotiations.

Indeed, what happens next in the real economy matters far more than the careful finessing of words aimed at sustaining the Paris Agreement, now in its tenth year. COP gatherings can feel like hyperrealities – those deeply invested in their machinery often want us to believe that the staged grandeur at these events represents reality. We should respect them for what they are, but also recognise their limitations.

This is especially true now, given the state of multilateralism today, in an age marked by disorderly disruption of the international order. Multilateralism faces clear ill omens, and the headwinds threaten to take the sails off what was once a smooth-sailing ship.

At the Belem COP itself, not much was agreed on in terms of money or a roadmap for fossil fuel phase-out transitions that could have built on the Baku (COP29) settlement.

Perhaps Corrêa do Lago also noticed that, while the Brazilian COP sought to solidify global climate action in official meetings, the Blue and Green zones resembled a carnival of mini-conferences and the selling of ideas. The growing throng of people attending COP enclaves belies the limited ability to drive radical reductions in global emissions. Lively talks and debates do not always translate into real-world outcomes.

As Corrêa do Lago highlighted, in deciding which world we should start paying more attention to, lowering fossil fuel dependence must take into account increasing fragmentation of global collective action.

The response to these developments is not to collapse all efforts under the weight of disorder or slow the progress being made at UN Framework Convention on Climate Change COPs but rather to turn the conventional approach on its head.

Africa, through its first country platform – the South African Just Energy Transition Partnership – is showing how climate-led, investment-based solutions tied to the real economy can create tangible shifts.

Regarding fragmentation, a common pattern is clear: spoiler groups are determined to slow down any agreement or pathways towards more rapid and radical decarbonisation – essential if we are to meet the 1.5 °C Paris goal.

The latest tally of Nationally Determined Contributions shows that global emissions trajectories are heading beyond the 1.5 ºC threshold. Without a strong US commitment, the climate ambitions of other States are likely to remain minimal.

Spoiler groups, along with the throng of lobbyists they bring, are deploying the same playbook at the G20 and the International Convention on Plastics.

Data must drive the new politics. For example, the International Energy Agency had to tone down its projections of oil decline by 2050, revising and softening any suggestions that oil consumption would peak, following US pressure.

Even the EU, long a champion of the Green Deal, is feeling the strain. It has had to dilute methane standards to allow gas imports with fewer restraints and temper other climate and environmental obligations. The entire political project of the Green Deal is facing testing times.

The elephant in the room when it comes to cheaper technologies for the transition is China, which remains the only country that can deliver lower-cost decarbonisation solutions to the rest of the world.

Meanwhile, US right-wing think-tanks decry reliance on China for renewables technologies, yet the irony is striking: the massive expansion of data centres in the US depends on Chinese-made batteries, for which no cheaper substitutes currently exist.

For Africans and many developing countries, diplomatic corridors remain open. Why should Africans not take advantage of China’s cost efficiencies? African nations have their own sovereign challenges to address, and leveraging available solutions is both pragmatic and necessary.

Further fragmentation is envisaged in climate finance. To navigate the maze of bilateral and multilateral funding sources, countries must be on the “right” geopolitical side. For developing nations, no matter the climate finance target agreed at COPs, accessing finance can be a Sisyphean task – especially given the fragmentation of climate finance sources, even without the added layer of geopolitical intrigue.

In these foreboding times, thinking out of the box is not just desirable – it is necessary.